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Introduction 
The papers in this special edition are a very small selection from those presented at 
the EU-NESCA (Network of European Studies Centres in Asia) conference on “the 
EU and East Asia within an Evolving Global Order: Ideas, Actors and Processes” in 
November 2008 in Brussels.1
 
 The conference was the culmination of three years of 
research activity involving workshops and conferences bringing together scholars 
from both regions primarily to discuss relations between Europe and Asia, perceptions 
of Europe in Asia, and the relationship between the European regional project and 
emerging regional forms in Asia. But although this was the last of the three major 
conferences organised by the consortium, it in many ways represented a starting point 
rather than the end; an opportunity to reflect on the conclusions of the first phase of 
collaboration and point towards new and continuing research agendas for the future. 
With the importance of the regional level and inter-regional relations firmly 
established, key amongst these agendas is now to unpack the Euro-Asian relationship. 
On one level, this entails considering what drives policy by considering the interests 
(and the sources of those interests) that are at the heart of European policy. It also 
entails going beyond conceptions of a Euro-Asian relationship and instead focussing 
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on multiple sets of relationships conducted by a range of actors driven by different 
sets of ideas and political objectives. And underpinning both of these tasks of 
unpacking is the key question of whether European policy (however defined) meets 
its objectives (and if not, why not)?  
 
Interregionalism and Europe-Asia Relations  
The idea that regions can become actors in international relations now has a relatively 
long history. Not surprisingly, this work focuses on regional organisations in Europe 
which, notwithstanding the rising significance in studies of other regional projects, 
and indeed in the concept of “comparative regionalism”, remains by far the most 
studied and debated example of regional integration.2
 
 As discussed in more detail 
later, much of this study revolves around the idea of Europe as a different kind of 
actor in international relations; one that does not act from the “normal” motivations of 
states, but instead is as Duchêne (1972) argued, a “civilian” (as opposed to military) 
power promoting liberal norms of rights and democracy in its interactions with other 
parts of the world; the much debated and oft criticised idea of “normative power 
Europe” (Manners, 2002). 
Building on this Eurocentric focus, the study of EU as a region that “acts” in 
international relations has spawned a new literature on how regions interact with each 
other in the international realm; the concept of “interregionalism” (Soderbaum & Van 
Langenhove, 2007). But while the understanding of what the region is in the European 
cases that acts is easy to identify as the EU (and its predecessors) the same is not true 
in other parts of the world. To be sure, there are plenty of regional organisations that 
the EU can interact with, but the membership of these organisations does not always 
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map onto the “region” that Europe wants to interact with. For example, if we think of 
the EU’s attempts to construct a relationship with something called “East Asia”, then 
ASEAN might be considered too small and/or too narrow and APEC too big and/or 
too broad.3
 
  
So when it comes to international relations at the regional level, the first step (quite 
logically) is to identify the region(s) under consideration. This is not quite as easy as it 
might sound. As the readership of this journal will fully recognise, identifying what 
we mean when we refer to Asia or East Asia remains a difficult and contested task. 4 
In some respects, the promotion of inter-regional dialogue between the EU and Asia 
has played a role in resolving this dilemma by forcing a decision over who would be 
part of the Asian side of the meeting (Camroux & Lechervy 1996). Initially, this 
understanding of Asia reflecting an emerging understanding of (East) Asia equating to 
the ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea – the now fairly well 
established idea of ASEAN Plus Three (APT).5
 
  But with India, Pakistan and 
Mongolia joining the Beijing summit in 2008 (alongside the ASEAN secretariat), and 
Russia and Australia invited to participate in 2010, the Asia that meets the EU in 
ASEM is becoming increasingly broad, diverse and heterogeneous.  
The extent to which ASEM has ever been anything more than a “talking shop” is open 
to question.6 But while increasing the number of participants provides a wider basis 
for taking (and listening), it perhaps even further narrows the opportunities for 
reaching consensus, and for the EU to promote its interest and attain its objectives. 
And perhaps not surprisingly, despite the ongoing ASEM process and the EU’s 
participation in the ASEAN regional forum, much of the formal diplomatic business 
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of Europe-Asia relations is not so much a case of multilateralism as multiple sets of 
bilateral relations.7 For example, the EU has separate “strategic partnerships” with 
China and Japan, and is progressing bilateral relations with South Korea and 
individual Southeast Asian countries in addition to having a long standing inter-
regional relationship with ASEAN as an organisation.8
 
   
Beyond Interregionalism: Multiple Asias, Multiple Relations 
So on a very simple and basic level, one of our objectives in the EU-NESCA project 
as reflected in the papers presented here is to highlight the variety of types (in plural) 
of EU-Asia relations. This includes formal interregional relations; not just the ASEM 
process, but the above mentioned EU-ASEAN partnership considered in this special 
edition by Camroux.  
 
But despite the growing significance of and interest in interregionalism, the majority 
of the EU’s interactions with Asia remains focussed on individual Asian states. In 
particular, the rise of China has resulted in a flourishing of the study of EU-China 
relations.9 At times it almost seems as if the study of EU-Asia relations has been 
swallowed up by the primacy of the EU-China bilateral relationship. Indeed, the 
intensity of interest in the relationship combined with the EU’s attempts to build a 
new relationship with China had led some to conclude that a new strategic alliance is 
emerging that might even undermine the global power and reach of the US.10
 
 
It is not surprising that China looms so large in the EU’s Asia policy and strategy 
(though the relative neglect of Japan perhaps more so). China is, after all, the EU’s 
second largest trade partner after the US, the single biggest provider of imports and 
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perhaps the best bet for new sources of foreign investment into Europe. And of 
course, as a non-democratic state, China is just the sort of place where the 
civilian/normative/democratisating pretensions of the EU as a new and “different” 
sort of international actor could and should be tested.  
 
This sinocrenticism in much of the work on EU-Asian relations was a reoccurring 
theme in the workshops and conferences over the three years, and its importance is 
reflected in the papers by Balducci and Gottwald in this collection. But in Egreteau’s 
paper on Burma and Camroux’s on ASEAN, we attempt to address the balance to a 
degree by focussing on other case studies – though interestingly case studies that 
generate some very similar conclusions to the nature of EU actorness and the 
effectiveness of EU foreign policy as studies of the relationship with China. Indeed, in 
combination, these papers make us rethink not so much the nature of this thing called 
Asia that Europe wants to engage with, but instead what is this thing called Europe? 
In particular we wanted to turn our focus to the European side of the relationship and 
the definitional problems that emerge from understandings of “Europe” as actor in 
international relations. In particular, we ask if the EU’s apparent objectives in 
interactions with Asia can actually be achieved though EU level interactions.  
 
Europe-Asia Relations: What is Europe? 
In the emerging literature on interregionalism, the focus is clearly on the regional 
institution as actor – hence the use of the idea of EU as interacting with Asia. But of 
course, the EU is not the only voice, or interest or actor in Europe (however we 
defined the region). And during the course of reading various academic and policy 
papers as we defined the topics for the NESCA workshops and conferences, we found 
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that terms like “Europe”, “the EU” and “Europeans” were often used interchangeably 
– even within single pieces of work - reflecting continuing confusion over the nature 
and location of interests, power, and action.  
 
For example, the investment and trade decisions of firms based in Europe are 
sometimes used as evidence to show European engagement of Asia in pursuit of the 
EU’s objective of building “strategic partnerships”. While the partnership might 
indeed be facilitated by non-state action (or indeed, non-state interactions might be 
facilitated by the establishment of partnerships), to think of these sets of relationships 
as being part of a concerted single unitary effort built around a single “given” interest 
is somewhat misleading.  
 
So one of the key questions that informed our work was whether this thing called 
“Europe” has become imbued with too much “actorness” (Hill, 1994) and if other 
sources of interest and action have become sidelined or compounded into a single 
unit/level of analysis. In the entirely correct attempt to show that nation states are not 
the only actors, has the balance has tipped a too far towards the idea of a single 
European component of Europe-Asia relations? 
 
From the onset it is important to point out that this is not a political exercise in 
“euroscepticism” nor an academic exercise of denying the significance of the EU as 
actor. There is no suggestion that the EU should not play a role, nor any suggestion 
that it does not play a role. The EU level of analysis is extremely important – partly in 
terms of what is done collectively at this level, and also partly in the way that EU 
level legislation plays out at the national level. Moreover, the speed at which the EU 
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has emerged as an actor of whatever sorts in relation to Asia is noteworthy. But as we 
study the EUs relations with Asia, we need to make sure that we retain a focus on 
other levels of interest, authority and action within Europe and not simply subsume 
them into a single process with a single interest.  
 
Through different agencies, the EU has itself done much to fund the study of the EU 
as an actor in international relations in general, and EU relations with Asia in 
particular (and perhaps even more particularly, EU relations with China). As 
recipients of some of this funding, we are very grateful for the opportunities it has 
provided, and the basis for long term linkages that this NESCA project has forged. If 
raising a few words of caution sounds ungrateful, it is not – they are words of caution 
to ourselves as observers and analysts about the sociology of our own endeavours and 
not to the EU itself.  
 
There has been a considerable expansion of studies of the EU level of interaction in 
recent years in Asia; indeed it’s probably fair to call it an explosion. There is nothing 
wrong with this in itself and indeed these initiatives should be applauded. The 
problem lies in the relative lack of attention on other dimensions of European 
relations and in following the funding we have perhaps collectively unbalanced the 
analysis by spending too much time on the EU level and not enough on the other 
dimensions. For example, the funding of EU/European studies in China has resulted 
in many who previously considered themselves to be country specialists rebranding 
themselves and refocusing their work on the EU. The study of Europe in China is 
increasingly becoming EU studies.11
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What is Europe? Levels of Analysis 
“Statist” Europe Beyond the EU 
Of course, there are many understandings of Europe that go way beyond the 
membership of the EU. Norway and Switzerland, for example are European states, but 
not part of the EU. Despite its previous appearance in this paper as a potential Asian 
member of ASEM, Russia is by most calculations a European state. Somewhat 
ironically, as perhaps the only state that can justifiably claim to be both European and 
Asian,12 Russia is typically conspicuously absent and considered as separate from  
“Europe” in discussions of Europe-Asia relations (just as it is considered as separate 
to Asia). Overall, the EU website lists a total of 19 countries which it terms “other 
European” states – non EU European states13
 
 - in addition to the three accession states 
of Croatia, Turkey and (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia.  
So while we can quite easily put this aside and use “Europe” as simply short-hand for 
the EU, we should at least keep as a mental footnote the idea that there is more to 
Europe than just the EU – either as an entity in itself or as a conglomeration of 
member states. Indeed, we should also have a second footnote that reminds us that 
what we thus mean by Europe today includes 12 countries that were not part of 
“Europe” under this understanding in April 2003. Of course, this change in 
membership doesn’t matter if “Europe” becomes an entity in itself with an interest 
and actorness that is more than those of the member states confined. However, the 
argument here is that such an interest and actorness is only partial – and in this respect 
size and membership is indeed important.  
 
Commercial Relations: Regional, State and Non-state levels of analysis 
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So if we accept these two caveats but also accept the idea of Europe as short hand for 
the EU, then we can move on to identify different levels of analysis emerging from 
the oft stated understanding that the EU might not be a state, but neither does it 
behave like a classic international organisation.14
 
 Commercial relations provide an 
interesting example of the importance of EU as actor, but also the limitations of 
focusing on the EU alone. 
The Commission for External Trade has clear responsibility for dealing with Asia on 
trade policy issues - both bilaterally and also within the WTO. Yet even here where 
member states have most clearly ceded “actorness” to the Commission, the situation is 
not clear cut. The EU’s interest is not simply “given” – an issue we will expand on 
shortly. For example, in the debates over how to respond to the growth in Chinese 
exports (particularly when the quota was filled early in 2005) revealed different 
positions from what we might call the “producers” and the “retailers” – the former 
those who wanted restrictions to reduce competition and the latter those who pushed 
for lax or even no restrictions in order to import and sell more Chinese made goods.15
 
 
Notably, during these debates, national governments became strongly associated with 
“their” dominant industries – Spain, France and in particular Italy with producers 
seeking limits on imports, and Britain, Germany and the Nordic states associated with 
retailers and therefore freer trade. 
So when it comes to dealing with Asia, the EU as actor is clearly important, but raises 
questions over which or whose interests are represented by EU policy. We can think 
of this “who matters” question in different ways. For example, which “sectoral” 
interests matter and how these interests are articulated and pressed directly at the EU 
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level national level (to influence the EU level). Or which “national” interests matter? 
Was Susan Strange (1996: xiv) right when she argued that “international organization 
is above all a tool of national government, an instrument for the pursuit of national 
interest by other means”? If so, is EU policy dominated by the interests of the “core” 
European economies? Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and the 
Nordic states?  
 
We should also be aware that in many European countries, local governments are also 
important commercial actors, either promoting local companies interaction with Asia, 
or promoting the region as a source of inward investment. Again, these local 
governments often act in competition with other similar actors – both other European 
actors, and other national actors. For example, different local development agencies 
were keen competitors during the Japanese and then South Korean investment booms 
into Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.16
 
 
Thus, within this commercial relationship we have a “mixity” of European relations 
with China based on different actors and different sites of authority.17
 
 We see the 
importance of the EU level, but also of companies/non state actors, and of 
governments – both as actors in their own right, and as part of the power constellation 
at the European level.  
So we have already reached a preliminary and perhaps rather straightforward 
understanding of the nature of the Europe that interacts with Asia. To this we might 
add two further layers of complexity. First, it is not just different national and/sectoral 
interests that feed into European policy. There are also differences of opinion and 
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interest at the EU level itself. For example, the parliament and the commission do not 
always wholly support each other’s position. Different DGs also have different 
positions; for example, officials in at least one DG were dismayed at the dominance of 
economic considerations in the EUs first official document on relations with China (or 
more correctly, they were dismayed at how the economic dimensions were being 
emphasises in the dissemination of the strategy – the written report was considered to 
be much more balanced).18
 
  
Now this might sound wholly obvious – and indeed it is. But the reason for pointing 
to this diverse source of interests and actions is because of the way that some have 
tried to establish an idea of the EU as a “unique” actor in international relations. As 
Balducci argues in his paper, the promotion of the idea of the EU as a “norm 
promoter” – either as Civilian Power Europe or as Normative Power Europe – that 
does not act like “normal” states can result in the source of policy being overlooked. It 
can, at an extreme, depoliticise the study of international relations by taking interest 
and intentions as “given”. So even though the understanding of the nature of EU as 
actor is entirely antithetical to realist conceptions of power maximising rational state 
elites, the conception of EU as unique actor can result in a similar discounting of the 
drivers of policy.  
 
The Non-State Sector and Meeting European Objectives 
And not all of this action is undertaken by states. We noted above the importance of 
states (and also the EU) acting on behalf of key business interests in dealing with 
Asia. But of course these companies are not simply part of a coherent national (or 
European) effort. They might seek help where they can get it, and indeed some 
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theorists would argue that when states act, they do so on behalf of powerful domestic 
corporate/economic interests. Here, then, the state is conceived as agent of 
economic/class interests and not the other way round – but in some analyses at least, 
the overseas activity of firms is taken as being part of a wider “national” and/or 
“European” effort; the firms become agents of national interests; alternatives site of 
authority and alternative form of inter-regional relationships and governance are still 
important. 
 
Of course firms are far from the only actors that have an at best ambiguous 
relationship with the state – and indeed firms are not usually considered to be part of 
the agenda when it comes to studying Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or 
inter/transnational civil society interactions. Such non-state interactions are an 
increasingly important element in Europe-Asia relations; and as Elmaco (2008) 
argues, in her paper, an increasingly important part of the European goal of 
democracy promotion.  
 
Interestingly, Elmaco’s study does not pit state and non-state as mutually inclusive, 
but sees non-state actors as playing an increasingly important role within existing 
inter-regional frameworks – frameworks that have largely been established by statist 
action (either individually or through state-led regional organisations). And while we 
might hypothesise that some state and EU level action is on behalf of the interests of 
non-state (commercial) actors - often in competition with interests of other non-state 
(commercial) actors – it is not just a one way street. At times, what appears to be non-
state action can actually be very closely related to state (or regional) objectives and 
goals. Indeed, it is often difficult to identify Non Governmental Organisations 
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(NGOs) that are really wholly independent of outside influence, and which meet the 
NGO Monitor’s definition of NGOs as “autonomous non-profit and non-
party/politically-unaffiliated organizations that advance a particular cause or set of 
causes in the public interest [emphasis added]”.19
 
 
For example, many development NGOs are really DONGOs – Donor Organised 
NGOs. This is particularly so with those NGOs that are charged (or created and 
charged) with delivering development projects on the ground; and in the European 
case, many NGOs rely on funding from governments and regional/global 
organisations, as well as from other NGOs. For example, according to CONCORD 
(the European NGO confederation for relied and development), around half of the 
European development NGO sector funding as a whole comes from a combination of 
member state governments, the European Commission, and UN specialist agencies 
(and the other half from private sources of different kinds).20
 
  
Taking a not-too wide definition of an NGO to include think tanks, foundations and 
policy institutions as well as more “traditional” development/democratisation 
promoting groups, then we have a situation where there is often a close relationship 
between the EU on one hand, and NGOs that study it, lobby it, and/or deliver 
functions on its behalf on the other. But there are also groups that work outside this 
network of relationships – some of them on a national scale only – and other still who 
act in some form of opposition to what they perceived to be the errors or omissions of 
either their national governments, the EU, or both. 
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So it is not so much a case of trying to identify NGOs as an extra single 
layer/dimension of European interaction with Asia, but rather to disaggregate different 
types of such NGO interaction – some of which appears very much a part of a 
concerted EU level promotion of “normative power Europe”, some of which seems to 
be occurring in some form of network collaboration, some of which occurs with close 
relations to national governments and some of which appears to be as independent as 
perhaps is ever possible for any NGO.  
 
Interpreting a European Interest: Europe as Actor viewed from Asia 
The extent to which it is possible to place a national identity non-state activity is of 
course extremely difficult. This is partly because it’s difficult to identify the extent of 
the linkages between state and non-state as already outlined above, but also because 
of the transnational nature of much non-state activity. In terms of economic actors and 
EU relations with Asia, perhaps the classic example is Airbus, which might seem to 
be the archetypal European transnational company, but which seems to change 
nationality depending on which political figure is on an overseas trip.  
 
For more traditionally defined NGOs the extent to which they are identified with a 
nation has also been blurred as many have become BINGOs – Big International 
NGOs – that operate transnationally. Others are very unhappy to be associated with 
national governments that they are themselves highly critical of - a sentiment that 
goes both ways with governments unhappy that the activities of groups that they have 
no control over sometimes reflects on them. The home country government is 
sometimes considered to be responsible for what its citizens do, and at times – for 
example, during the Olympic Torch procession through Europe – there seems to be a 
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conflation of action, identity and interest. The actions of individuals and groups in 
France that support Tibetan independence became simply “French”, and resulted in a 
popular campaign to boycott French goods and companies.21
 
  
Now clearly, this association of independent action with a nation and/or a concerted 
national effort, and/or even government policy is not something that is confined to 
Chinese perceptions. It is used here simply as an example of how perceptions of 
national identities and affiliations are important – and as noted above, many European 
companies are keen to exploit any national advantages that their governments can 
create for them. It might be possible to make exactly the same point about how 
different types of Asian actors are perceived as having a national identity in Europe. 
But the papers in this collection are specifically on conceptions of European actors 
and Europe as actor, and the final objective is to consider the way in which Europe is 
perceived from Asia.  
 
Again, the question of what is Asia could be raised here, and perhaps should;  but 
time and the specific focus of these sessions means we focus only on understandings 
of what is Europe. Returning to the discussions established at the start of this paper, 
we ask what is the Europe that Asia thinks of? Has Europe become synonymous with 
the EU, or when Asia thinks of Europe, is it thinking of a handful or “core” Western 
European states? Is Europe thought of as actor in its own right, or is it short-hand for 
the aggregate actions of the individual component actors? Has the focus on Europe 
replaced a focus on individual European States, or do the two levels of analysis co-
exist (and is there any tension between conceptions of these two different types/levels 
of actor and actorness?). In combination, the overarching question is whether within 
16 
 
Asia there are emerging conceptions of Europe as single actor with a coherent set of 
interests and the means of transmitting interests into actions? 
 
Collective Conclusions: Towards a Framework of Analysis 
To repeat, then, the intention here is not to deny the importance of the EU as actor in 
relations with Asia, but instead to establish six key considerations that provide a 
framework for studying Europe-Asia relations, and attempt to contextualise 
understandings of European actorness and interest.  
• First, most simply, we need to take care that we know what we really mean 
(and others infer the same meaning) when we talk of Europe.  
• Second, we need to identify different sites of authority within Europe by 
considering who does what in terms of differential levels of interaction with 
Asia – what lies within the competence and authority of the EU, what is done 
by governments (both national and subnational), and what is done by 
independent  actors (companies and NGOs). 
• Third, we should not conceive of the EU level as constituting a single actor 
with a single interest, but disaggregate it – for example, what is the role of the 
different DGs, or the European. 
• Fourth, what is the relationship between non-state actors and both the national 
and EU levels of authority?  
• Fifth, we need to consider the way that the actions of “other” European actors 
either contribute to or undermine the attainment of EU level objectives 
• Sixth, and very much related, we should not simply accept the EU interest as 
“given” but instead go back to basic principles of the study of politics and 
consider where the interests of EU as actor derive from.  
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In combination, these considerations not only allow us to develop a more nuanced 
(albeit more complicated) understanding of the nature of Europe-Asia relations, and 
Figure One provides a very rough and simplistic diagrammatic representation of  
multiple actors and channels of action through which “Europe” interacts with Asia. 
And of course, if we were to unpack what we mean by Asia here as well, then the 
number of actors, the types of connections and the amount of interactions would 
increase dramatically; thus the idea of “simplified complexity”.  
 
Figure One about here 
“Simplified Complexity: Levels and Layers of European Relations with Asia” 
 
Even if we restrict the focus to the EU level of action, then disaggregation allows us 
to consider the efficacy of the attempt to promote the idea and practice of Europe as a 
new and unique type of actor in international relations (Civilian Power Europe or 
Normative Power Europe). And the broadly defined areas for consideration outlined 
above are reflected in the collective conclusions from the papers presented in this 
collection. 
 
Diverse Actors Diverse Interests 
The first collective conclusion relates to the EUs ability to attain its self defined goals. 
The answer in part is that it depends on the issue at hand. When it comes to trade 
where EU member states have willed power to the EU level, then there is indeed 
considerable “actorness”. The same is not the case when it comes to more 
traditionally defined diplomacy and foreign policy which remain (for the time being at 
least) still largely the preserve of national governments.  
18 
 
 
Which brings us back to the discussion at the start of this paper relating to the EU as a 
different type of actor – a civilian/normative power.   And perhaps the single most 
important  collective conclusions of the papers by Egreteau, Camroux and Balducci 
and to a lesser extent Gottwald is that if the EU is trying to promote a new set of 
global norms in general, and to promote human rights and civil society in Burma and 
China in particular, then it has failed! Nor does there appear to be successful in its use 
of interregionalism as a means of transmitting its values; largely because of the 
myriad actors and interests that coexist not just alongside the EU level, but also at the 
EU level itself. 
 
Throughout the papers in this collection, we see the way in which different priorities 
of individual member states result in diverse sets of European relations with Asia, and 
also competition to create EU level policy that reflects national interests. For example, 
Egreteau unpicks a wide range of different European policies towards Europe; the 
UK, Scandinavia and some East European countries hard line; the Netherlands and 
Sweden actually financed Burmese activists; Germany and France tried to move away 
from ostracising the Burmese regime; Italy was conciliatory; Poland and Hungary 
followed the US position; and the rest of the EU simply didn’t seem to be really 
bothered. Moreover, Egretau even identifies a distinction between what is said by 
European governments at home and what their diplomats in Burma actually say and 
do on the ground. The EU might have a common policy, but in reality there is more 
diversity, fragmentation and competition than cooperation behind a single objective.  
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Building from this, a second theme that emerges is that while the expansion of the EU 
to a membership of 27 might have complicated affairs by bringing in new actors and 
interests, in reality it is a relatively small number of European states that dominate and 
shape agendas. At the risk of oversimplification, it is still the major powers of what 
was Western Europe in the Cold War that tend to be most important in shaping 
European discourses and policies.  
 
And at the risk of further oversimplification, the collective findings suggest that these 
national interests are largely shaped by the nature of each country’s economic 
engagement with Asia. This is not to say that public opinion is unimportant. In 
particularly, in those north European countries that have a strong self identity as 
bastions of democracy and human rights, public opinion plays an important role in 
shaping policy towards authoritarian regimes in Asia. Companies too seem to be more 
than aware that being seen to be too close to unpopular regimes can have a 
detrimental impact at home. But by and large, economics seems to matter most, and 
be the decisive factor when economic pragmatism and ethical considerations pull in 
different directions. 
 
Whilst Balducci argues that competing national interests largely shape the nature of 
conflicts over EU policy (and between EU policy on one hand and national policies 
on the other), he argues that membership of the EU does have a “socialising” impact 
on individual member states. For example, he argues that EU membership resulted in 
Sweden dropping its former critical approach towards China’s human rights regime, 
towards a more “mainstream” pragmatic and business oriented one. Gottwald also 
suggest that things might be changing – in relation to China at least. When China was 
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conceived of as a great opportunity, then individual countries competed with each 
other to gain the best possible access for “their” firms. As conceptions of China 
shifted, and the discourse increasingly became one of China as a “threat”, then the 
tendency towards looking for collective action as a means of providing protection 
increases.  
 
Of course, it is far too early to know how far the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
might also enhance the EUs ability to develop a stronger and more unified voice. But 
defining a single EU voice is not just a case of sorting through different national 
interest, but also different interests at the EU level itself. For example, Camroux 
points to the importance of the Parliament as the self defined promoter of a moral 
ethical position contra the more practical and (economically) pragmatic Commission. 
Balducci identifies similar divisions between the “pragmatic” Commission and the 
Council of Europe which is more prepared to adopt critical positions based on ethical 
concerns.  
 
Ponjaert and Beclard move the analysis “down” from the apex of the EU level to 
focus on scientific R&D public projects in the shape of the Galileo project with china 
and the  ITER process with Japan. While these reveal the importance of the EU as 
actor and the development of an EU “footprint” in Asia, they also reveal the 
“fragmented” and “opportunistic” nature of EU policy, and the multi-layered sets of 
interests that result in policy, with fundamentally different policies adapted alongside 
each other. 
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So our final collective conclusion is that the EU really is an important actor in 
Europe’s relations with Asia, but it is not the only actor. Moreover, accepting the self-
identification of the EU as a civilian power driven by morality and ethical standards in 
its relations with Asia runs the risk of ignoring the multiple interests, actors and 
processes that shape the myriad sets of Euro-Asian relations today. Politics is 
sometimes defined as “the art and science of government”. But it is also often defined 
in Laswell’s (1936) words as the study of “who gets what, when, how”. We suggest 
that this latter understanding provides a fruitful starting point for the study of what is 
likely to become an ever more important but also ever more complex set of European-
Asia relations in the future.  
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Technological Development, and we gratefully recognise their support for this project. 
2  For good introductory overviews of the evolution of the concept and practice of Europe as 
actor in international relations, see Smith (2008) and Bretherton and Vogler (2005). 
3  On how the EU perceives of and tries to construct this idea of an East Asian region to interact 
with interregionally, see Gilson (2005) and Doidge (2008). 
4  Amongst many others, I have made my own attempt to do this in Breslin (2007). 
5  Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were not part of the original process but joined in 2004.   
6  On what ASEM has actually done, See Gaens (2008). 
7  And here ASEM is important in providing a locus for summits with individual Asian countries 
alongside the multilateral process – as was the case, for example, with the first EU-China 
summit that directly preceded the ASEM summit in London in 1008. 
8  And if we take a different view of what is Asia, then the EU also has a strategic partnership 
with India and separate relations with SARC.  
9  For a good representative example of the range of issues that this literature covers, see Kerr & 
and Liu (2007). 
10  For an overview of these arguments and a critique of them, see Callahan (2007). 
11  I am grateful to Song Xinning for providing this observation.  
12  UEFA’s definition of Europe for footballing purposes includes in Kazakhstan a country with 
an easternmost border that is roughly on the same latitude as Urumqi, Sikkim and Kolkata. 
Kazakhstan withdrew from the Asian Association in 2001, and was admitted into the 
European association the following year.  
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Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, 
Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican City. 
14  For a good overview of the theoretical debates about the nature of the EU, see Pollack (2005). 
15  Nedergaard (2009). 
16  For example, according to the then Secretary of State for Wales, Peter Walker (1991), Toyota 
had agreed to build its new factory in Newport, but this was moved to Derby, where more 
parliamentary seats were at stake, after the direct intervention of Prime Minister Thatcher.  
17  On the idea of mixity in trade relations and negotiations, see Meunier & Nicolaïdis (1999). 
18  Personal discussions with an anonymous official.  
19  See http://www.ngo-monitor.org/index.php 
20  See www.concordeurope.org 
21  Including Carrefour which primarily sells Chinese goods and is more indigenised than many 
overseas companies operating in China. 
